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There are a number of medical ethicists who would change their view if
their assessment of the moral status of a fetus changed.1
A second worry a reader might have about the account of disagreement
offered by Camosy involves the classification of ethical theories. Utilitiarian
theories are said to be a subset of teleological theories, which are a subset
of consequentialist theories. Camosy appropriately anticipates confusion
and so is careful to define consequentialist theories as those “which locate a
primary moral concern in the consequences of one’s actions” (182). Theories
are teleological if they are “concerned with achieving an end” and utilitarian if that end is “the end of maximizing utility” (182). His taxonomy differs
from the usual classification of ethical theories and this might be due to his
use of the indefinite article prior to primary in defining consequentialism.
Consequentialist theories are often thought of as having a single primary
concern, whereas a teleological theory (e.g., Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia) takes into account consequences but not only consequences. I do not
wish to quibble with definitions here, but merely to point out that how we
classify theories might affect our understanding of their similarity.
My worries with the arguments offered in this book require two qualifications. First, if Singer’s view shifts significantly in the future, as Camosy
suggests it might, then the disagreement between Singer and Christians
might become insignificant. Second, Camosy’s claim that Christians might
learn from Singer because he is consistent is instructive. This suggests that
the intended audience is not academic philosophers who already strive
for consistency and take Singer’s work seriously, even if we disagree, but
a group hostile to Singer, who the author believes lack a basic virtue of
philosophical thought. If one is interested in reconciliationist ethics, the
book will prove worthwhile. If one has taken Singer and consistency seriously, the book may be of less interest.
1
Consider, for example, Mary Anne Warren’s now famous article “On the Moral and Legal Status
of Abortion,” Monist 57 (1973), 43–61.

God and the Multiverse: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Perspectives,
edited by Klaas J. Kraay. New York: Routledge, 2014. 248 pages. $140.00
(hardback).
KIRK LOUGHEED, Monash University
This edited volume by Klaas J. Kraay brings together twelve contributions
which explore different philosophical, theological, and scientific issues
surrounding the multiverse. The book is helpfully divided into five main
sections.
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The first section, “Physicists on God and the Multiverse,” features two
contributions from physicists. In his chapter “Puzzled by Particularity,”
Robert B. Mann offers both scientific and theological reasons for thinking
that on theism a multiverse is unlikely. Mann argues that the multiverse is
posited by physicists to avoid fine-tuning arguments for theism (31, 32).
The alternative multiverse explanation to the existence of our universe is
“driven by a desire to avoid cosmocentrism and any special assumptions
that go along with it. [The multiverse] is a-teleological, in the tradition of
methodological naturalism” (34, 35).
Mann has two main reasons for rejecting the plausibility of a theistic
multiverse. First, normal scientific inquiry about the multiverse is impossible by definition because only our current universe is observable. Thus,
multiverse theories are by definition unfalsifiable (35). Second, Mann
believes that the scientific evidence for a multiverse makes it likely that
every logically possible universe is concrete. This allows for a powerful
theological objection against the theistic multiverse. If there is a multiverse, then there are many universes containing much more evil than ours
(38). Thus, if the multiverse exists, the problem of evil becomes far more
challenging to answer. While Mann admits that it is possible to imagine
imposing an axiological threshold on the multiverse such that in order to
be actualizable by God a universe must meet that threshold, current science does not support such a position (39).
Mann’s piece highlights significant differences in motivation between
physicists and philosophers of religion for postulating the theistic multiverse. For example, philosophers of religion have recently posited the
theistic multiverse as a (partial) solution to the problem of evil. If our universe is in a multiverse, then the theist can respond to the problem of evil
by pointing out that God did in fact create many universes much better
than ours. Likewise, with respect to the problem of no best world, the
theist can posit that God did indeed create the best possible world while
preserving the intuition that our universe could not possibly be the best.
The multiverse is the best possible world containing many different universes, including many better than ours. For the multiverse to succeed as
a solution to these problems, however, there may need to be a minimum
axiological threshold such that only universes above the threshold are
included in the multiverse by God.
In “The Everett Multiverse and God,” Don N. Page argues that the
actual world is the best possible world containing a multiverse with
many universes (50). He suggests that the laws of physics governing our
universe are extremely mathematically elegant and beautiful. While humans would prefer that the world contain less evil than elegance, Page
claims that God might have a much greater appreciation of the laws of
physics and that their existence might therefore be very valuable to God
(52). Page’s account explicitly assumes that there can be no value in an
object without a consciousness to experience pleasure from that object.
Page speculates that there might be an inevitable trade-off between the
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pleasure God derives from the mathematical elegance of the universes
and the evils that inevitably result from the laws of physics. Page muses
that “if it is indeed true . . . that God gets tremendous satisfaction from the
elegant laws of physics that He creates, it would not be right to expect Him
to give that up to the degree that would be required for a much smaller
happiness that might be afforded His creatures if they were spared from
evils like cancer and earthquakes” (54). Page concludes that while God
could have used other laws of physics, or simply collapsed the quantum
state in ours to avoid evil (i.e., perform intervening miracles) to avoid
all natural and moral evil, it might have decreased the overall value of
the world by decreasing the elegance of the universe and the pleasure he
derives from it.
Both Mann and Page claim that if there is a multiverse then all logically
possible universes are concrete. Note that if they are correct then the scientific evidence in favour of a multiverse cannot be appealed to as additional
support for multiverse solutions to the problem of evil or the problem of no
best world, since they require a threshold. This is an important, yet often
neglected, tension between the scientific evidence for the multiverse and
appeals to the theistic multiverse in contemporary philosophy of religion.
The second section of the book is called “Theistic Multiverse: Details
and Applications.” Jason L. Megill’s paper, “An Argument for Modal Realism,” argues for the conclusion that “there are at least two worlds that contain literally concrete entities” (94). Thus, Megill proposes a more modest
version of Lewis’s modal realism. I will not detail Megill’s argument here,
but his paper is important because he acknowledges that certain scientific
multiverse theories cohere better with theism than others.
The many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics is that every
universe has the same physical constants as our particular universe. Thus,
not every logically possible universe is concrete (i.e., the ones with other
physical constants). This is different from Tegmark’s theory, which says
any universe that can be described with a mathematical structure is concrete and is closer to implying that every logically possible universe is
concrete. Megill explains that “if a view like Lewis’s or Tegmark’s is true,
then all logically possible universes will be [concrete]; but then universes
that are not worthy of actualization will be [concrete]. This would undermine the multiverse response to the problem of evil, if not theism itself”
(108). But if restricted modal realism is true, or a multiverse theory which
does not imply every logically possible universe is concrete, then it could
be that only those universes worthy of creation exist (i.e., those above a
certain axiological threshold). Megill’s contribution is significant because
he is one of the few philosophers of religion who seem keenly aware that
not every scientific multiverse theory bodes well for theists wishing to use
the multiverse as a solution to the problem of evil or the problem of no
best world.
Donald A. Turner’s “Revisiting the Many-Universes Solution to the
Problem of Evil” is a response paper defending his position that the
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multiverse can help respond to the problem of evil. Turner argues that
God creates a multiverse containing every universe above some minimum
threshold, perhaps those universes that contain a favourable balance of
good over evil (114). As mentioned above, there are scientific reasons to
doubt that the multiverse has a threshold. Here is a philosophical reason
to doubt that there can be a threshold distinguishing which universes are
included in a theistic multiverse: If certain counterfactual statements can
obtain such that they would make our universe fall below the threshold,
then they are not genuine possibilities. This is because God cannot actualize any universe below the threshold. Thus, any theistic multiverse with
a threshold wreaks havoc on our common sense modal intuitions that
things could have turned out otherwise (specifically that they could have
turned out quite a lot worse).
The third section of the book is “Criticisms of Theistic Multiverses”
and contains Michael Almeida’s very provocative paper “Best Worlds and
Multiverses,” in which he argues that the theistic multiverse solutions to
the problem of evil and problem of no best world fail simply because theists do not need solutions to those problems. Briefly, Almeida claims that
a lot of the value of a universe is the result of agents’ freely conforming
to the requirements of justice. In order for such acts to be free (and hence
valuable), it must be metaphysically possible for moral agents in a perfect
universe to instead choose evil and actualize a bad universe (155). But
this entails that there must be a universe where such evil actually occurs;
otherwise, the morally good agents are not free and hence contribute no
value to their universe. Thus, there cannot be good universes without correspondingly bad universes. Unpacking Almeida’s ideas in detail would
be a much larger project (he has published extensively on related topics),
but it is worth noting that his account avoids denying our common sense
modal intuitions that things could have genuinely turned out a lot worse.
Still, Almeida’s picture of modality might leave the theist puzzled about
how God can coexist with so much evil.
The fourth section of the book is called Pantheistic Multiverses. In
“Multiverse Pantheism,” Yujin Nagasawa explains that “[m]ultiverse pantheism . . . holds that God is identical with the totality of all universes, that
is, the multiverse that includes our universe” (177). Nagasawa claims that
multiverse pantheism is a unique view and avoids certain major problems usually associated with traditional pantheism (178). According to
Nagasawa, the most challenging objection to multiverse pantheism is the
problem of evil. There is a much larger quantity of evil in the multiverse
than in our single universe. On this view God “encompasses all possible
forms of evil including utterly awful ones such as innocent people being
tortured for a long time, possibly an infinite amount of time, for no reason.
It is difficult to think that such a being is qualified to be God” (187).
The fifth and final section is “Multiverses and the Incarnation” which
contains two papers, one by Robin Collins and another co-authored piece
by Timothy O’Connor and Philip Woodward. The quality of these two
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contributions is excellent, but I suspect that they will be of interest only
to Christian theists, so I will not elaborate on them here. Given space constraints, I have also not discussed papers by Jeremy Gwiazda, John Leslie, Peter Forrest, and Michael Schryemaker. But all of their contributions
merit study by philosophers interested in the multiverse.
Throughout this review I have highlighted some of the tensions between scientific accounts of the multiverse and the recent philosophical
reasons theists have for a multiverse. There are, of course, deeper issues
lurking here about the interaction between science and philosophy. A
multiverse with a threshold coheres better with theism because it does not
include every universe, and thus excludes extremely evil ones. However,
it fails to preserve our modal intuitions that universes far worse than ours
are indeed genuine possibilities. The scientific evidence is controversial,
but both Mann and Page agree that if there is a multiverse, then every
logically possible universe is concrete. This view preserves our intuitions
that our universe could be a lot worse, since if there is a multiverse, then
there really are other worse universes. But the theist will likely remain
uncomfortable with this scenario because it entails such a large amount of
evil (perhaps infinite?) co-existing with God.
The overall quality of the essays in this volume is excellent. They all
make interesting and unique contributions to the multiverse literature. I
was most fascinated by the papers from Megill, Almeida, and Nagasawa.
The section on pantheism will be welcome to those who have recently
criticized contemporary philosophy of religion for its narrow focus on
Christian theism. This volume is important to any philosopher interested
in the multiverse. I also predict that it will become required reading for
any philosopher of religion wanting to research the connection(s) between
God and the multiverse. I highly recommend it.

Theology, Aesthetics, and Culture: Responses to the Work of David Brown, edited
by Robert MacSwain and Taylor Worley. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012. 313 pages. $125.00 (hardback).
J. SAGE ELWELL, Texas Christian University
This volume of nineteen essays, with accompanying “Response” and
“Postscript,” comes out of papers presented at a 2010 conference hosted
by the Institute for Theology, Imagination, and the Arts at the University
of St. Andrews entitled “Theology, Aesthetics, and Culture: Conversations
with the Work of David Brown.” The book includes the twelve plenary
papers from the conference and seven additional chapters. The book is
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